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Abstract
In ﬁnancial theory, the optimal allocation of assets and its relationship with
proﬁtability has been one of the main concerns; the question has always been if
banks should focus or diversify their assets. In our case, we would like to answer
this question focusing in diversiﬁcation of the loan portfolio, presenting a theoret-
ical model that considers the possible gains from diversiﬁcation, while taking into
account the eﬀects of monitoring. Additionally, we present empirical evidence on
this matter for the Colombian banking system. According to the model, we ﬁnd
that once the banks have chosen its optimal level of monitoring, expected return is
always higher when the bank decides to focus. Additionally, the empirical results
suggest that there are no possible gains form diversiﬁcation in bank’s cost and that,
on average, the eﬀects of focusing the loan portfolio reduces bank’s return while
showing positive eﬀects of focusing on an speciﬁc sector.
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In ﬁnancial theory, the optimal allocation of assets and its relationship with proﬁtability
has been one of the main concerns; the question has always been if banks should focus
or diversify their assets. In our case, we would like to answer this question focusing in
diversiﬁcation of the loan portfolio, presenting a theoretical model that considers the
possible gains from diversiﬁcation, while taking into account the eﬀects of monitoring.
Additionally, we present empirical evidence on this matter for the Colombian banking
system.
In ﬁnancial literature we can identify two diﬀerent theories of how banks should allocate
their assets. On one hand, corporate ﬁnance theory suggests that banks should focus
their portfolio so as to reduce information asymmetries and to maximize beneﬁts from
greater expertise. On the other hand, traditional banking theory argues that banks
should diversify as much as possible their portfolio in order to reduce risk, reducing the
probability of a costly failure.
Corporate ﬁnance argues that there is a negative relationship between diversiﬁcation
and proﬁtability that is usually sustained by agency problems at two diﬀerent levels: ac-
cording to Denis et al. (1997) managers diversify beyond optimal levels without suﬃcient
corporate control; and diversiﬁcation, specially regional, increases asymmetry informa-
tion problems that make monitoring more costly and diﬃcult to provide. Moreover,
Berger and DeYoung (2001) state that the lack of scope economies can be translated
in higher costs (i.e. learning, human capital with sector or regional experience, higher
variable costs for having new costumers). On this line, Hayden et al. (2006) ﬁnd evi-
dence that shows that portfolio diversiﬁcation across sectors, industries and region leads
to a negative eﬀect on banks’ proﬁtability rather than increasing bank returns. Also,
Achayra et al. (2006) ﬁnd that “in contrast to the recommendations of traditional port-
folio and banking theories, diversiﬁcation of bank assets is not guaranteed to produce
superior return performance and/or greater safety for banks”1.
Banking theory suggests that there is a positive relationship between proﬁtability and
diversiﬁcation. This view sustains that credit portfolio diversiﬁcation allows for some
compensation between losses of some credits with the earnings of others; with this com-
pensation, centralized monitoring is proﬁtable, Diamond (1996). In addition, according
to Winton (1999) banks should use diversiﬁcation as a tool for enhancing beneﬁts only if
they face moderate downside risk levels and monitoring incentives need to be strengthen
. Moreover, there is an argument in favor of the existence of economies of scale in the
business administration, and the reduction of product and labor and, ﬁnancial market
failures Chandler (1977).
However, it is important to notice that the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation vary according
to the size and type of ﬁnancial intermediary. Winton (1997) ﬁnds that diversiﬁcation
1Achayra Viral V., Hasan Iftekhar and Saunders Anthony. (2006). “Should Banks Be Diversiﬁed?
Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios”. Journal of Business, vol. 79, No. 3, 2006: pg 1356.
2aﬀects competition among ﬁnancial intermediaries since large diversiﬁed banks have the
ability to oﬀer a higher expected return to investors than small riskier banks. Moreover,
large banks have the power to centralize costly monitoring and avoid the duplication of
monitoring eﬀort by small investors, Diamond (1996).
It is important to take into account the eﬀect that diversiﬁcation has in the beneﬁt func-
tion. Winton (1997) argues that a better diversiﬁed bank faces less risk, thus reducing
the probability of bad outcomes and the costs associated with them. Another way of
reducing costs has to do with monitoring. Winton (1999) recognizes that increased di-
versiﬁcation may lessen monitoring eﬀectiveness, increasing the frequency and severity
of bad-outcomes, resulting on an increase in banks’ costs.
Summarizing, there is not a consensus for the relationship between risk and focus, some
empirical works have shown that this relationship is positive, depending on the risk faced
by the ﬁnancial entities; while some others have shown that the costs of diversiﬁcation
can be greater than the beneﬁts.
In the model that we present in the following section, we ﬁnd that once the banks
have chosen its optimal level of monitoring, expected return is always higher when the
bank decides to focus. Nevertheless this results have to be evaluated when some of the
assumptions of the model are relaxed.
Some empirical works have found that diversiﬁcation has a positive eﬀect on bank’s
proﬁtability, when the assumptions proposed by Winton (1999) hold. Achayra et al.
(2006) analyze the relationship between risk and return, and the level of diversiﬁca-
tion for the Italian banking system. They used an annual database of 105 commercial
banks for the period between 1993 and 1999, using as return measures ROA and stock
return; and as risk measures ﬁve diﬀerent indicators, which included expected and un-
expected losses. For the quantiﬁcation of the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation, the variables
employed where two Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHI): one for the industrial sector
and a second for the household sector. The evidence for the Italian banking system sug-
gests that “both industrial and sectoral loan diversiﬁcation reduce bank return while
endogenously producing riskier loans for high-risk banks in our sample. For low-risk
banks, these forms of diversiﬁcation either produce an ineﬃcient risk-return trade-oﬀ
or produce only a marginal improvement”2.
Hayden et al. (2006) consider the case for German banks using an annual database3 from
1996 to 2002, and ﬁnd that banks use diversiﬁcation as a tool to change their risk-return
proﬁle instead of operating in a constant risk-return eﬃciency level. Additionally, they
ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation depend on the risk level faced by banks. As
return measures, they use the ratio of operating proﬁts to assets and operating proﬁts
to equity; their results are robust for both measures. As independent variables they
used three diﬀerent HHI to capture the levels of concentration for region, sector, and
2Achayra Viral V., Hasan Iftekhar and Saunders Anthony. (2006). “Should Banks Be Diversiﬁed?
Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios”. Journal of Business, vol. 79, No. 3, 2006: pg 1357.
3The database consisted of 3,760 individual institutions including banks and it’s subsidiaries.
3industry; and the ratio of unexpected losses to total exposure as a measure of risk.
Stiroh (2004) considers the impact of focus and diversiﬁcation strategies on the per-
formance of community banks. He uses annual data obtained from the Consolidated
Report of Conditions and Income for the period 1984-2000. In order to capture the
eﬀects of diversiﬁcation strategies, he includes two concentration measures: a revenue
HHI and a non-interest income HHI. The ﬁrst one intends to capture diversiﬁcation
from non-interest and interest income, while the second aims to measure diversiﬁcation
within non-interest bearing activities. They ﬁnd that community banks try to expand
their operations to diversify their income, but they end up moving beyond their areas
of comparative advantage.
In the same line of revenue diversiﬁcation, Goddard et al. (2007) analyze the eﬀects
of shifting into non-interest income activities by U.S. credit unions. They use semi-
annual data from the Call Reports of these institutions in the sample period 1993-1 to
2004-2 and include two measures to capture diversiﬁcation. The ﬁrst one is the ratio
of non-interest income to operating income (NONSH) and, the second, is an income
concentration index. They found that large credit unions have been able to improve
their performance at the cost of a higher risk, while small credit unions don’t have the
scale nor the expertise to engage activities diﬀerent to their core products.
In our empirical framework we are going to consider, as the main explaining factors of the
return indicators, risk and three diﬀerent types of loan diversiﬁcation: (i) Sectoral, (ii)
type of loans and (iii) regional. On one hand, we ﬁnd that there is positive relationship
between return and risk, as it is suggested by portfolio theory. On the other hand, and
as predicted by our model, there exists a negative relationship between return and type
of loan diversiﬁcation, and that sectoral diversiﬁcation has a non-linear relationship
with the expected return measures.
It is important to mention that the indexes used as measures of concentration, are used
in the absence of others that could better explain the levels of focus in the economy
and its eﬀect on expected returns. Moreover, this framework not necessarily goes in
the same line of the theoretical explanation of diversiﬁcation, since this theoretical
explanation includes variables like monitoring or structures with free riding or moral
hazard problems, that can’t be empirically measured. Nevertheless, these indexes and
the diﬀerent variables used to measure the cost and beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, are a
good approximation of the theoretical model presented.
The following sections are organized as follows: in section two we present the theoretical
model of banks’ loans diversiﬁcation. In section three we describe the data used for the
empirical analysis, section four focuses on the estimation of beneﬁt and cost functions
and concluding remarks are in section ﬁve.
42 The model
In this section we develop a model that allows us to explain under which conditions banks
engage in multiple-bank lending activities in order to diversify their loan portfolio. This
model is based on Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993) and Carletti et al. (2007). From the
latest, we take some of their assumptions to structure our model. We use this model
to capture the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on expected returns, using monitoring as one of
the main explaining factors.
The model is developed based on a two-period economy (t = 1,2) with two banks
(j = 1,2), n entrepreneurs, and k investors. Each bank has one unit of funds with
which they extend loans to entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur has a risky investment
project that needs to be ﬁnanced. They have to compete to obtain ﬁnancing from banks
and only two of them obtain the funds needed.
Each project has a random return R, where R ∼ i.i.d. across projects. Each project
(i = 1,2) needs one unit of external funding at t = 1, and yield a return Xi ∈ {0,R} at
t = 2. The project success depends on the entrepreneur’s behavior. If he behaves, the
project has a success probability pH and if he doesn’t the probability is pL, considering
that pH > pL. If the entrepreneur misbehaves he receives a private beneﬁt B that
can be though as a managerial cost. Private beneﬁt generates a moral hazard problem
because entrepreneur’s behavior is not observable and he is protected by limited liabil-
ity. Additionally, since banks raise deposits and are also protected by limited liability,
depositors face moral hazard problems from the bank, however, we are not considering
this last moral hazard problem.
Each bank has an amount Ej of inside equity and they raise an amount D of deposits,
so that E + D = 1. Banks pay a ﬁxed rate r for deposits and at the end of period 2
they pay investors rD. With this funds a bank can choose between ﬁnancing solely one
project or ﬁnancing two projects. If the latest is chosen, each bank ﬁnances half of the
project and they share evenly its return. The idea around ﬁnancing two projects is that
by doing so banks achieve a better degree of diversiﬁcation (though is limited)4. Also,
banks can allocate their funds in an alternative investment that oﬀers a gross return y.
Banks lend to an entrepreneur that oﬀers a positive expected return higher than y. We
follow the assumptions of Carletti et al. (2007) to ensure that lending is not feasible
without monitoring. That said, the main assumptions of our model are:
PHR > y > PLR + B (A1)
and
4Diversiﬁcation is considered as limited because banks can only lend to two entrepreneurs, if the
banks were able to lend to more entrepreneurs the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation could be greater. As is








where ∆P = PH − PL. Assumption A1 means that credit lending to an entrepreneur
is only worthy when he behaves, otherwise the bank should allocate their funds in the
alternative investment. Assumption A2 makes references to the private beneﬁt, B is
high enough to persuade entrepreneurs to misbehave. Given this two assumptions banks
must monitor to make lending feasible.
By monitoring projects banks may detect and prevent entrepreneurs’ misbehavior, thus








Each bank must choose the amount of eﬀort invested in monitoring mi,j ∈ [0,1],
which can be interpreted as the probability with which the banks makes an entre-
preneur i behave. Monitoring implies a cost C(mi,j) = c
2m2
i,j, where c represents
the cost of monitoring each project. The convexity of C(mi,j) represents a continu-
ous increasing diﬃculty for a bank to obtain additional information of the entrepre-
neurs actions and, also, diseconomies of scale in monitoring. As can be seen, the ﬁrst
and second derivative of the cost function with respect to monitoring, are positive: ￿
∂C(mi,j)




= c > 0
￿
.
The timing of the model is described in Figure 1:
Figure 1: Timing
t = 1 t = 2
Banks choose their
deposit rate r, investors
decide where to deposit













realised and claims are
settled.
Moral Hazard Moral Hazard
We solve the model for individual-bank lending and then for multiple-bank lending.
With this results we compare each model’s expected return evaluated in the optimal
level of monitoring, and determine under which conditions diversiﬁcation could yield a
higher return.
2.1 Individual-bank lending
In this subsection we derive the equilibria for individual-bank lending. At t = 1 banks
set the deposit rate r, guaranteing depositors a return r ≥ y. Afterwards, each bank
6chooses the project with the highest expected return and ﬁnances it. In between t = 1
and t = 2, banks determine the level of monitoring eﬀort, so that it maximizes the
bank’s expected return function. Since banks act independently, we solve the model for
one representative bank5.
The bank’s expected return is given by:




where the ﬁrst two terms on the right side of the equation represent the expected return
after depositors have been repaid, the third term yE is the opportunity cost of equity,
and the last term is the monitoring costs.
The probability for depositors of being repaid depends on the success probability of the
project, given that banks are protected by limited liability and deposit contracts are
subject to bankruptcy risk. If the project is not successful then, depositors can’t be
repaid.





An increase on the rate of return R or on the success probability of the project, increases
monitoring eﬀort, ceteris paribus. Under the same circumstances an increase on r
reduces the monitoring eﬀort since banks try to keep the expected return unchanged,
otherwise, the project could become not feasible. An increase on r represents a higher
cost for bank’s deposits, reducing the bank’s expected return. Since the bank wants
to keep at least the same expected return, other costs, like monitoring, have to be
reduced. Finally, and as it is to be expected, an increase in the monitoring cost reduces
the monitoring eﬀort due to the reduction of the expected return.
In equilibrium, higher monitoring eﬀorts beneﬁts banks and depositors in the way that
it increases the success probability of the project, reducing the bankruptcy risk and the
probability of expected shortfalls. Additionally, it is important to consider that external
ﬁnancing generates a moral hazard problem, that increases with the amount of deposits
as banks are protected by limited liability. Seen from this point of view, the higher the
inside equity E invested in the project, the higher is the stake of the bank, hence they
have a greater incentive to monitor increasing the probability of success. To summarize,
monitoring incentives increases with project’s return and equity, while it falls with rate
of deposits and monitoring cost.
5Since both banks are identical, the solutions are symmetrical.
72.2 Multiple-bank lending
Now we turn to the case of multiple-bank lending. The main diﬀerence with the model
explained above is that now each bank ﬁnances half of each project and, at the end,
they split the projects’ return equally. Similar to the previous model, banks set the
deposit rate r6 and chooses its monitoring eﬀort (mi,j) that maximizes the expected
return. Where i = 1,2 represents the project to by ﬁnanced by the j = 1,2 bank.
In this case banks lend half of its funds to each entrepreneur7 and end up ﬁnancing half
of each of the two projects and, if the projects are successful they receive half of each
project’s return R
2 . Banks choose simultaneously the amount of monitoring eﬀort in a
non-cooperatively fashion, however, their eﬀorts are mutually related. Since monitoring
is a cost for the bank, if the other bank is being successful detecting the misbehavior of
any of the entrepreneurs, this could be an opportunity cost for the ﬁrst bank, because its
eﬀort of monitoring won’t be needed. Nevertheless this game is static, where none of the
banks’ monitoring eﬀort can be observed by the other. Therefore, the total monitoring
eﬀort, form both banks, in project i is given by:
Mi = mi,j + mi,−j − mi,jmi,−j (2.3)
where Mi is the total monitoring eﬀort, mi,j is the eﬀort exerted by bank j and mi,−j
is the monitoring eﬀort of the other bank.
























As before, the ﬁrst two terms of the sum can be interpreted as the bank’s expected
return from the two ﬁnanced projects after depositors have been repaid. The third
term represents the monitoring eﬀort cost, while the last term of the expected return,
is the opportunity cost of equity. Nevertheless, one of the main diﬀerences is that the
monitoring cost is higher, since the bank now monitors two diﬀerent projects.
The main features of multiple bank lending are expressed by equations (2.3) and (2.4).
First, since banks do not coordinate their monitoring eﬀort and it is not observable, bank
j has the incentive to reduce their eﬀort since he can beneﬁt from the others bank’s
monitoring, thus resulting in a free riding problem. In addition, there might exist
duplication of eﬀort given that banks can end up monitoring the same entrepreneur’s
behaviors. Secondly, bank’s achieve a greater degree of diversiﬁcation by ﬁnancing two
independent projects, therefore, reducing the banks’portfolio variance and the expected
shortfalls.
6Since the market structure is a monopoly, the interest rate on deposits is the same for both banks.
7i = 1,2








































From Equations (2.2) and (2.5) we ﬁnd that bank j´s return is better diversiﬁed in the
case of multiple bank lending, reducing their exposure to credit risk and the variance
of the loan portfolio.
In the multiple-bank equilibrium the incentives to monitor are altered due to the free
riding problem and duplication of eﬀort is an issue. As can be seen in appendix A
both banks would choose to diversify if the return of the project is suﬃciently high, if
R ≥ 2rD. If the return of the project is not large enough (0 < R < 2rD), there would
be two Nash equilibriums where only one of the banks monitors (see Appendix B). In









As in individual bank lending, monitoring incentives increase with project’s return and
equity and reduce with increments of the deposits rate, monitoring cost and other bank’s
monitoring. As can be seen from (2.7) and (2.8), the optimal level of monitoring when
one bank monitors is higher than the optimal when both banks monitor.
This results suggest that banks rather engage individual-bank lending since their ex-
pected return, when the monitoring is in its optimal level, is always greater than when
they perform multiple bank activities (see Appendix C). The intuition behind these
results is that when the bank chooses the multiple-bank lending case, the probability
of success is the same while the cost of monitoring is higher since the bank now has to
monitor two projects. However, this results are consistent under the assumptions made
before, where the return of both projects is the same, the success probabilities for each
project remain constant, and both banks set the same interest rate on deposits.
93 Data
The main data source used for our analysis are the bank’s balance sheet and income
statements provided by the Financial Superintendence of Colombia8. Additionally, we
used the Form 322 to obtain information about loan allocation across regions for each
one of the banks of the sample. The information coming from the income statements
were annualized and all the variables are expressed in real terms of 1998, using the CPI.
Our sample consists of quarterly information of 47 ﬁnancial institutions, between com-
mercial banks and BECH9, for the period 1995Q1 - 2007Q4. Along the period of analysis
the number of institutions changed because of mergers, acquisitions and new entries to
the ﬁnancial system (i.e: for the ﬁrst period, the sample had 31 banks and 9 BECH, at
the end of the period, there where only 16 banks).
We estimated two diﬀerent functions in order to capture and analyze the eﬀects of
focus on expected returns. The ﬁrst function we estimated was the traditional beneﬁt
function. Nevertheless, since we used monitoring as one of the main inputs in the
theoretical model, we need to estimate another function that would be able to capture
this relation. Since the eﬀort of monitoring is not observable, we used an approximation
and estimated a cost function that would be able to capture the eﬀects of monitoring
and its relation with diversiﬁcation and its impact on expected returns. We used these
two diﬀerent functions in order to clarify the diﬀerent eﬀects of focus on proﬁtability,




As return measures we created two proﬁtability indicators: RCA and RCE, which are
mere modiﬁcations of the traditional ROA and ROE. In the numerator we have the
Financial Margin, measured as the diﬀerence between interest income and interest ex-
penses, instead of net income. This measures allow us to analyse return of the loan
portfolio and the impact that diversiﬁcation has on it.
8Speciﬁcally, we used Form 341 and the PUC (Plan ´ Unico de Cuentas), the latest is the system used
for all the ﬁnancial institutions to report the required information to the Financial Superintendence.
9These are the banks that were specialized in mortgage lending. Since 1999, this entities were







To measure diversiﬁcation we use a Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is a
traditional accepted measure of concentration. It is calculated as the sum of squares









where n is the number of groups, Si represents the exposure of bank i and S is the total
exposure. The HHI is deﬁned in the interval ( 1
n,1). It takes the value of 1
n when the
portfolio is perfectly diversiﬁed and 1 when it is fully concentrated.
For our estimations we constructed three diﬀerent indexes to capture diﬀerent ways of
diversiﬁcation: a loan portfolio index, a sectoral index, and a regional index. The ﬁrst
HHI considers diversiﬁcation across the four diﬀerent types of loans that banks oﬀer
to their clients (HHI-L)10, the second one (HHI-S), measures diversiﬁcation across the
seventeen sectors in which the economy is disaggregated11, and the third index makes
reference to diversiﬁcation across the thirty-three provinces (HHI-R)12.
Our approach for risk is based on two diﬀerent indicators: The ﬁrst one is a measure
of expected losses NPL and the second, is a weighted indicator of the RCA’s volatility








10In Colombia there are four diﬀerent types of credits: Commercial, consumption, mortgage and
micro-loans. Micro-loans are oriented to small and medium enterprises.
11This classiﬁcation is taken according to DANE(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Es-
tad´ ıstica).
12According to DANE, Colombia is divided into thirty-two provinces, and for diﬀerent calculations,
the capital, Bogot´ a D.C., is also considered as an additional province.
11where E is equity, A is total assets, and σRCA(i-years) is the standard deviation of RCA,
where i-years is the length of the period used to measure the standard deviation. We
computed three diﬀerent σ13 in order to capture the persistence of the RCA’s volatility.
Figure 2: Hodrick-Prescott Decomposition of RCA and NPL
Source:Financial Superintendence of Colombia, Banco de la Rep´ ublica’s calculations.
As control variables we used three diﬀerent measures: The ﬁrst control variable is Equity
on assets and it intends to capture the diﬀerent risk aversion levels among banks. The
second variable is personnel and it is used as a proxy of cost eﬃciency (Achayra et
al. (2006)), it is calculated as the ratio of personnel cost to total assets. Finally, we
control with a dummy for the crisis period (Crisis). In order to deﬁne this variable
we used a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter and decomposed the NPL and the RCA; afterwards,
chose the years where NPL was above and the RCA was below their long-term trend,





The cost function was constructed following Estrada and Osorio (2004), where the
dependent variable Total Cost is deﬁned as the sum of interest, personnel and admin-
istrative expenses. We divided the independent variables between inputs and outputs,
and estimated two diﬀerent cost functions with diﬀerent outputs in order to identify
possible gains from diversiﬁcation.
In the ﬁrst approach, we used gross loans as our main output. In the second, we used
13One, two and three years.
12three outputs: commercial loans, consumption loans, and mortgage loans14. Both of the
cost functions included three input prices. The ﬁrst price is the price of ﬁnancial capital
w1, computed as the ratio between interest expenses and shot-term funding, where the
short term funding (STF) is deﬁned as the sum of saving accounts, checking accounts




The second input is the price of labor w2 deﬁned as the personnel expenses per employee,
calculated as the ratio between personnel expenses and total number of employees. The
data available for the last variable is incomplete, thus, we estimated the remaining data
assuming a constant relationship between the number of employees15 and ﬁxed assets16.
Finally, the third input price w3 is the price of physical capital calculated as the ratio
between administrative fees and physical assets.
w2 =
Personnel Expenses




For this estimation we control by four variables17. The ﬁrst variable, size, is intended
to capture bank’s size eﬀects on the cost function and it is measured as the ratio of
a bank’s assets to the total assets of the system. Secondly, NPL aims to capture the
possible eﬀects of risk on the total cost. As a third control we used the IPI 18 and its
purpose is to capture the economic cycle. Finally, we included the dummy variable
Crisis.
As we mentioned before, we included two diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial institutions in
our sample, banks and BECH. Since the last ones were specialized in mortgage loans,
we included a dummy variable to capture the diﬀerence between these two groups.
We decided to use this variable after we found diﬀerent performance levels and other
characteristics between banks and BECH, even though, the results showed that this
14In this deﬁnition we excluded micro-loans due to data availability.
15The data available was provided by Asobancaria.
16For this estimation we followed Estrada and Osorio (2004) obtaining the following results:
ln(employees) = −1.5227 + 0.8475 ∗ ln(ﬁxed assets)
(0.1517) (0.0147)
with standard error in parenthesis.
17The control variable size was not included for this estimation because it is highly correlated with
commercial and gross loans.
18IPI stands for Industrial Production Index
13variable is not statistically signiﬁcant, thus we avoid including it in the result estimations
presented in section 4.
3.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables included in the beneﬁt function
estimation. As can be seen the mean of HHI Loans is 0.8679 showing a high concen-
tration for loans, while the mean for the indexes of sector and region are 0.3416 and
0.4264, respectively, showing a moderate level of concentration.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Beneﬁt Function Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RCA 704 0.0571 0.0356 -0.0193 0.1830
RCE 704 0.5358 0.3142 -0.1348 1.6640
HHI Loans 723 0.6302 0.1689 0.2942 1.0000
HHI Sector 723 0.2899 0.1216 0.1159 1.0000
HHI Region 723 0.3634 0.1908 0.0581 1.0000
NPL 723 0.0563 0.0362 0.0000 0.2763
Z-Score (3) 658 -9.5635 12.3098 -75.9598 20.6580
Personnel 704 0.0279 0.0122 0.0009 0.0695
Equity on assets 723 0.1088 0.0312 0.0122 0.2436
Looking at the return measures shows that in the case of the RCA its standard deviation
is low, while the one for the RCE is ten times larger, the same can be observed for the
mean of this two variables, while the RCA mean is 0.0571, the mean for the RCE
is 0.5358. In the case for the control variable Personnel the media of this ratio is
close to 3%. It is important to notice the large variance of the risk measure Z −
Score(3), its standard deviation is 12.3098, with a minimum value of -75.9598 and a
maximum of 20.6580, a similar case of large variation is presented in the control variable
Equity on assets.
Regarding size, each ﬁnancial institution of the sample represents, on average, 3.37%
of the total assets of the sample. Even though, the entity with largest participation
represents around the 20% of the total assets, showing evidence of large diﬀerences
between the size of the ﬁnancial institutions included in the sample.
Table 3 presents the correlations of the variables mentioned above. As can be seen there
is a high correlation between the regional and sectoral Herﬁndahl indexes, this can be
the result of the high specialization of some provinces of Colombia in some sectors of the
industry. For example, there are a few mining provinces that concentrate an important
share of the loans destined to this sector, as a result the ﬁnancial institutions that
concentrate most of these type of credits have a higher correlation between these two
indexes (close to one).
For the case of the cost function variables, Table 2 shows the summary statistics. In the
14Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Cost Function Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Cost 1329 2,642,757 2,396,992 45,319 15,400,000
Gross Loans 1329 12,400,000 13,900,000 97,940 129,000,000
Consumption 1271 3,154,583 3,583,517 66 28,600,000
Commercial 1329 7,697,950 10,300,000 97,940 97,800,000
Mortgage 728 2,960,260 4,949,402 100 25,000,000
w1 1329 15.8427 10.6159 2.5800 121.7600
w2 1329 296.4975 179.1370 5.0300 2,040.1900
w3 1329 8.2864 5.0420 0.7100 68.0400
Size 1329 0.0333 0.0327 0.0010 0.2077
NPL 1298 0.0583 0.0456 0.0001 0.5122
IPI 1329 116.5776 13.2651 96.6600 160.5500
case of Gross Loans the mean and the standard deviation are similar. These behavior is
not rare since it includes all types of loans and all types of ﬁnancial institutions of the
sample, small and large. On average, the largest amount of loans is 79.54 times larger
than the smallest one, in December 2007 the smallest amount of loans of an entity was
$1.87 b, while the largest amount was $129 b.
In table 4 the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables of the cost function
are presented. There are a few variables with a high correlation i.e Commercial and
Consumption with Gross loans. This behavior is to be expected since the latest is
constructed as the sum of all types of loans. Additionally, they are not used together
in the estimations because they are part of diﬀerent approaches for the cost function.
Table 3: Correlation Matrix for the Beneﬁt Function (Variables in First Dif-
ferences)
HHI-L HHI-S HHI-R NPL Z1 Z2 Z3 Pers E/A
HHI-L 1.00
HHI-S 0.03 1.00
HHI-R 0.03 0.02 1.00
NPL -0.13 -0.04 0.05 1.00
Z1 -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.01 1.00
Z2 -0.12 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.32 1.00
Z3 -0.14 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.18 0.53 1.00
Pers -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.19 -0.11 -0.07 -0.13 1.00
E/A 0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.25 -0.32 -0.44 0.24 1.00
15Table 4: Correlation Matrix for the Cost Function (Variables in First Diﬀer-
ences)
T.Loan Cons Comm Mort w1 w2 w3 Size NPL IPI Cris
T.Loan 1.00
Cons 0.53 1.00
Comm 0.68 0.14 1.00
Mort 0.29 0.06 0.09 1.00
w1 -0.18 -0.05 -0.22 0.04 1.00
w2 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.33 1.00
w3 -0.20 -0.08 -0.19 0.03 0.82 0.45 1.00
Size 0.47 0.17 0.27 0.60 -0.13 -0.02 -0.10 1.00
NPL -0.19 -0.01 -0.28 0.08 0.25 0.05 0.20 -0.05 1.00
IPI 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.22 -0.13 -0.19 -0.02 -0.03 1.00
Cris -0.21 -0.22 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.12 -0.09 1.00
4 Empirical Framework
In this section we present the results of the estimations for the beneﬁt and cost functions
of the banks included in the sample. In order to assess the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation and
risk on banks’ return, we regress return on concentration measures and the risk indicator
as shown in the following equation:
RCAi = β0 + β1HHI-Li + β2HHI-Ri + β3HHI-Si + β4riski +
7 X
i=5
βiXi + ￿i (4.1)
Where Xi is the set of control variables mentioned in section 3, including the dummy
Crisis; the HHI are intended to capture the average eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on bank’s
return. And εi represents a stochastic shock to the beneﬁt function. We estimated this
function using Pooled-OLS19.
In table (5) we present the results of the estimations when the RCA is the dependent
variable, while in table (6) the results correspond to the RCE. For both measures of
return we estimated equation (4.1) with several restrictions, and found that all coef-
ﬁcients remain relatively stable for all speciﬁcations. From the results we can state
that HHI-R is not statistically signiﬁcant in explaining banks returns, while HHI-L
is highly signiﬁcant20and it has a negative eﬀect on bank’s return. These results are
restated by all the speciﬁcations that include this indexes. The HHI-S is signiﬁcant at
5% when the dependent variable is RCA 21 and has a positive eﬀect on bank’s return.
The negative coeﬃcient of the HHI-L suggests that, on average, the eﬀects of focusing
the loan portfolio reduces bank’s return while the positive coeﬃcient for HHI-S shows
19We used this estimation method after performing a Haussman test for panel eﬀects and the Breusch
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random eﬀects.
20At 1% when the return measure is the RCA and at 5% when the RCE is the dependent variable.
21If the dependent variable is RCE, HHI-S is not statistically signiﬁcant.
16Table 5: Estimations for the Beneﬁt Function: Dependent Variable RCA
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
d.HHI − L -0.0385*** -0.0373*** -0.0404***
0.0068 0.0068 0.0067
d.HHI − S 0.0302** 0.0253* 0.0273*
0.0109 0.0111 0.0112
d.HHI − S
2 -0.0259* -0.0214* -0.0243*
0.0105 0.0108 0.0108
d.HHI − R -0.0027 -0.0032 -0.0021
0.0031 0.0031 0.0032
d.Z3 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
d.Per 0.1964* 0.2060* 0.2244* 0.2363** 0.2337** 0.2092*
0.0858 0.0860 0.0877 0.0879 0.0879 0.0880
d.E/A 0.1230*** 0.1200*** 0.1177*** 0.1124*** 0.1140*** 0.0608***
0.0169 0.0168 0.0172 0.0173 0.0172 0.0158
Cris -0.0009* -0.0009* -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0010*
0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Cons 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0004
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Obs. 631 631 631 631 631 631
us evidence for the positive eﬀects of focusing on an speciﬁc sector, nevertheless, the
quadratic form of this index shows that this type of focus has decreasing, but positive,
eﬀects on bank’s return.
In addition, we ﬁnd that risk has a positive eﬀect on return in all speciﬁcations, in
other words, the higher the risk a bank face the higher are the returns, this result is
in accordance with the guidelines of portfolio theory and Markowitz’s Mean-Variance
theory. Moreover, the results show that the dummy variable captures the negative eﬀect
of the crisis on bank’s return. However, this results do not hold in the case when the
RCE is the independent variable.
From the point of view of the cost function we examine the eﬀects of diversiﬁcations
by estimating two equations of the cost function. In the ﬁrst one we include loans as a
whole (gross loans) and in the second one we estimate the equation by including loans
by type. If diversiﬁcation helps reducing cost, we expect that the sum of the marginal
eﬀects evaluated in the mean of the explanatory variables22 to be less in the second
equation than in the ﬁrst one.







22This is excluding control variables.
17Table 6: Estimations for the Beneﬁt Function: Dependent Variable RCE
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
d.HHI-L -0.1870** -0.1890** -0.2024**
0.0704 0.0702 0.0677
d.HHI-S 0.0152 0.0130 0.0064
0.0294 0.0296 0.0278
d.HHI-R -0.0275 -0.0313 -0.0224
0.0318 0.0319 0.0320
d.Z3 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032***
0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
d.Per 3.7057*** 3.6906*** 3.8232*** 3.8563*** 3.8307*** 3.9574***
0.8900 0.8887 0.8923 0.8920 0.8916 0.8918
d.E/A -0.2585 -0.2521 -0.2751 -0.2982 -0.2820 -0.6803***
0.1756 0.1740 0.1753 0.1752 0.1745 0.1602
Cris -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0067 -0.0067 -0.0066 -0.0054
0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0042
Cons 0.0062* 0.0061* 0.0076** 0.0076** 0.0075** 0.0067*
0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028
Obs. 631 631 631 631 631 631








In table (7) we present the results of the estimation for the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (Eq.4.2).
The results show that gross loans and the three prices included in the regression are
highly signiﬁcant in explaining bank’s cost. These four variables have a positive eﬀect
on bank’s cost, as it is to be expected. The variable size captures eﬃciently the mag-
nitude of bigger banks on the cost function, this variable is highly signiﬁcant in these
speciﬁcations. The variable risk, measured as NPL, is not statistically signiﬁcant in
explaining bank’s cost. This results is counterintuitive since one could expect that the
higher the NPL, the higher the cost for the bank, since they are not receiving interest
payments for those loans. We ﬁnd that the economic cycle has a negative eﬀect on
bank’s cost, that could be thought as economies of scale. The variable Crisis has a
negative eﬀect on bank’s cost, that is, in the crisis periods bank’s costs were lower. This
eﬀect could be explain given that in crisis periods banks reduce their loan activities and
re-allocate their portfolio to safer investments.
Table (8) shows the results for the second speciﬁcation of the cost function (Eq.4.3). In
this case the only loan signiﬁcant variables are consumption and commercial loans23. As
in the ﬁrst equation, all prices are highly signiﬁcant and have a positive eﬀect on bank’s
cost. For this estimation, NPL is signiﬁcant and has a negative coeﬃcient, meaning
that a higher level of non-performing loans is traduced into a lower cost, as above, this
result is counterintuitive.
23Mortgage loans is only signiﬁcant in speciﬁcation (4c)
18Table 7: Estimations for the Cost Function
(3a) (3b) (3c) (3d)
d.Gross loans 0.1608*** 0.1365*** 0.1163*** 0.1484***







d.Size 8.9096*** 8.9259*** 6.5253*** 8.9083***
0.8186 0.9170 1.0563 0.8441
d.NPL -0.2372 -0.3344* 0.3903* -0.2047
0.1363 0.1526 0.1738 0.1396
d.IPI -0.0020*** -0.0024*** -0.0033*** -0.0024***
0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004
Crisis -0.0213*** -0.0039 -0.0253*** -0.0275***
0.0057 0.0063 0.0072 0.0058
Constant -0.0006 -0.0033 0.0098* 0.0011
0.0033 0.0037 0.0043 0.0034
No. of obs. 1,252 1,252 1,252 1,252
Table 8: Estimations for the Cost Function
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d)
d.consumption 0.1610*** 0.1542*** 0.1453*** 0.1624***
0.0180 0.0222 0.0331 0.0202
d.Commercial 0.1586*** 0.1523*** 0.0463 0.1297***
0.0258 0.0317 0.0470 0.0288
d.Mortgage 0.0081 0.0029 0.0501** 0.0121







d.Size 6.8016*** 7.6652*** 1.2973 6.0235***
0.9860 1.2098 1.7923 1.0964
d.NPL -0.6662*** -0.7833*** 0.2673 -0.4634**
0.1299 0.1595 0.2337 0.1437
d.IPI -0.0013*** -0.0014** -0.0042*** -0.0021***
0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0004
Crisis 0.0010 0.0232** -0.0091 -0.0174**
0.0060 0.0073 0.0108 0.0066
Constant -0.0136*** -0.0183*** -0.0010 -0.0076
0.0038 0.0047 0.0069 0.0042
No. of obs. 680 680 680 680
When we analyze the sum of the marginal eﬀects for the dependent variables, evaluated
in the mean, we ﬁnd that their are greater for the second equation. This result suggests
19that the eﬀects of loan focusing in reducing cost is greater than from diversifying the
loan portfolio. This result implies that there are not possible gains form diversiﬁcation
in bank’s cost.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we want to assess the return volatility of each bank with respect to
changes in the concentration levels, speciﬁcally in the HHI’s. To do this we calculated
the standard deviation of each bank’s index during the last three years.
With diﬀerent combinations of these standard deviations we shocked the HHI’s and
estimated the returns using the results of the RCA’s estimation. The shocks were
divided into 8 groups:
• Shock 1: plus one standard deviation of the HHI-L
• Shock 2: minus one standard deviation of the HHI-L
• Shock 3: plus one standard deviation of the HHI-S
• Shock 4: minus one standard deviation of the HHI-S
• Shock 5: plus one standard deviation of the HHI-L plus one of the HHI-S
• Shock 6: plus one standard deviation of the HHI-L minus one of the HHI-S
• Shock 7: minus one standard deviation of the HHI-L plus one of the HHI-S
• Shock 8: minus one standard deviation of the HHI-L minus one of the HHI-S
Figure 3: Shocks 1 and 2
20Figure 3 shows the results for shock 1 and shock 2. The results show that, on average,
increasing loan concentration in one standard deviation improves bank returns by 0.72%,
while, decreasing it by the same amount improves them by 0.89%. This shows that,
on average, banks can beneﬁt from loan diversiﬁcation. We found that bank 1 returns
decreases when loan concentration increases and increases when the opposite happens.
Also, banks 6 and 7 do not beneﬁt from neither focusing nor diversifying on loan type.24.
Figure 4: Shocks 3 and 4
Figure 4 shows the results for shock 3 and shock 4. The results suggest that banks
can beneﬁt more, on average, from focusing in sectors. Increasing sector concentration
by one standard deviation yields a proﬁt increase of 0.95%, whereas, increasing sector
diversiﬁcation by the same amount increases proﬁts by 0.76%. As mentioned before,
banks 6 and 7 do not beneﬁt from focusing or diversifying by economic sector. Addi-
tionally, these two banks are the only ones that obtain a better result from diversifying
rather than from focusing by sectors.
Figure 5 shows the results for shock 5 through 8. As one can notice, the most proﬁtable
strategy for banks is to increase loan diversiﬁcation by on standard deviation and in-
crease their type of loan focus by the same amount. This strategy yields an increase of
bank returns near to 1%. As it is to be expected, the worst strategy among all is to
focus by type of loan and diversify by economic sector, though, it renders an increase
on returns for almost all banks. When analyzing combined shocks we ﬁnd that Bank 1
only beneﬁts when he decides to increase type of loan diversiﬁcation, and they get their
best result when combined with sector focusing, as all other banks. Again, we ﬁnd that
banks 6 and 7 do not obtain a positive result from any of the strategies considered.
24Nevertheless it is important to notice that the estimations depend on the level of return observed
on the last period.
21Figure 5: Shocks 5 through 8
5 Concluding Remarks
In the previous sections we presented a theoretical model for analyzing the eﬀects of
focus on bank’s expected return and found that, once the bank has chosen its optimal
level of monitoring, the expected return from diversiﬁcation is always smaller than the
expected return when banks choose to focus. Additionally, the incentives to monitor
depend positively on project’s return and the equity invested in the project by the bank;
and negatively on the deposit rate, the cost of monitoring, and bank’s −j monitoring
eﬀort.
According to the empirical evidence, we found that banks can take advantage of type
of loan diversiﬁcation to increase their returns. However, this beneﬁt could be oﬀset
by sectoral diversiﬁcation, since the main proﬁts from focusing by type of sector are
higher than those reachable through diversiﬁcation. In addition, the empirical evidence
conﬁrm the positive relationship between risk and return stated by portfolio theory.
In accordance with the results of the sensitivity analysis, we may conclude that banks
should take advantage of the strategy described by shock 7, since it is the one that
yields the best result in terms of return.
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24A Multiple-bank lending equilibrium
The expected return function for the multiple-bank model is given by (A.1), while (A.2)










































































The banks’ expected return when both banks monitor is greater than the expected













Since mi,−j(1−mi,j) > 0 and ∆p > 0, both banks would choose to monitor if and only
if:
R > 2rD (A.3)
25B Multiple-bank lending equilibrium
B.1 Nash Equilibria
In this appendix we are presenting the game for the banks, with the optimal level of
monitoring in each case, showing that the results are two Nash equilibriums where only
one of the banks monitors.
• In the case of multiple bank lending we showed that the optimal level of monitoring






Additionally, since in this case both banks monitor, the total optimal monitoring
level is given by:
M∗ = m∗ + m∗ − m∗m∗
M∗ = 2m∗ − (m∗)2
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Where equation (B.1) is the expected return for each bank, when both banks
monitor.
26• Nevertheless, in the case when only one bank monitors, the expected return for

















































































where equation (B.2) represents the expected return of the bank that monitors,
when only one bank monitors.








































Given all the payments mentioned above, the payments matrix is given by Figure (6)
With these payments, the equilibriums are: Nash1 = {monitoring,no monitoring},
Nash2 = {no monitoring,monitoring}. This equilibriums are explained as follows:
27Figure 6: Payments matrix
Monitoring
B.1 , B.1 B.2 , B.3


































































Since one of the conditions of the model is that the cost of monitoring has to be




, all terms in equation (B.5)
are positive and the conditions holds. This result means that when the other bank
monitors, the strategy of No monitoring is the best response for the bank. This
condition holds for either bank.










The condition given in equation (B.6) holds, meaning that when the other bank’s
strategy is No monitoring the best response of the bank is monitoring.
These previous results show that the result of the game are two Nash Equilibrium where
only one of the banks monitors.
28C Multiple-bank lending vs. Single-bank lending
C.1 When R < 2rD
The expected return in single-bank lending (E[πND]) is greater than the expected return
from multiple-bank lending when only one bank monitors (E[πju]) if:















































rearranging, (C.1) can be rewritten as:




















Since R > rD, all terms in (C.2) are positive, and the condition holds. When the
monitoring level is optimal, the expected return from single-bank lending is greater
than multiple-bank lending.
C.2 When R > 2rD
In this case, since the return is high enough, both banks choose to monitor. Similar to
the previous subsection, single-bank lending expected return is greater than the case of
multiple-bank lending when:



















29Since the optimal level of monitoring is the same for both banks in the case of multiple-
bank lending, the optimal level of monitoring for both projects is also the same M∗
1 =
M∗
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If both terms of the equation are positive, the condition will hold. Since the ﬁrst term
and ∆p are positive, the condition of non-negativity will depend on the sign of the









As can be seen, this condition holds since the numerator of the ratio on the right hand
side of (C.5) is greater than the numerator of the ratio on the left side. In addition, the
denominator of the ﬁrst ratio is smaller than the denominator on the left ratio.














+ RrD + 4(rD)2 > 0
and












The last line shows that the cost of monitoring has to bee smaller than the expected
earnings, which is a condition of the model. If the cost of monitoring is higher than
the expected earnings, the bank won’t have enough incentives to monitor, since the
expected returns will turn out to be negative.
Summarizing, when both banks decide to monitor and choose the optimal level of
monitoring, the expected return from focus is always higher than the expected return
from diversiﬁcation. The expected return from single-bank lending is greater than the
multiple-bank lending case. The intuition behind these results is that when the bank
chooses the multiple-bank lending case, the probability of success is the same while the
cost of monitoring is higher since the bank now has to monitor two projects.
31